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Point/Counterpoint:  












 In recent decades, governments have committed enormous public resources to subsidize 
construction of new stadiums, and the dollar value of taxpayer contributions for these subsidies 
continues to climb. Spending of taxpayer dollars includes both direct subsidies from state and 
local governments, as well as indirect subsidies from the use of tax‐exempt bonds to finance 
construction.  
 In granting stadium subsidies, governments claim that the stadiums are a public good that 
attracts tourists and businesses, thereby generating increased spending and job creation—benefits 
that flow to the community rather than to team owners. But do such benefits exist, and are they 
large enough to justify the scale of the subsidies? Brad Humphreys, Professor of Economics at 
West Virginia University, and Victor Matheson, Professor of Economics at the College of the 
Holy Cross, address the wisdom of public funding of sports stadiums based on the evidence. 
Brad argues that stadiums should not be subsidized by taxpayers, as the evidence fails to identify 
any tangible economic benefits generated by stadiums, and a growing body of evidence reveals 
that stadiums also generate additional local crime, pollution, and congestion. In contrast, Victor 
argues that while the economic benefits of a new stadium are probably not high enough to justify 
a taxpayer subsidy of the full construction costs, the benefits may be enough to justify covering 
some fraction of the costs. Furthermore, governments may use the subsidies to achieve desired 
development in targeted neighborhoods. 
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Is there a case for subsidizing sports stadiums? 
 
Introduction 
The case in favor of subsidizing large sports facilities is much harder to make than the 
one against. The peer-reviewed literature typically finds little or no evidence that the 
construction of new professional sports facilities results in significant increases in any type of 
measurable economic activity including personal income, wages, employment, tax revenues, or 
tourist spending. (Coates and Humphreys, 2008) In addition, the privately funded consulting 
reports that frequently accompany stadium proposals, and which invariably tout large economic 
benefits from subsidized stadiums and arenas, have been shown to suffer from significant 
theoretical flaws that make their conclusions suspect at best, and simply false at worst. 
(Crompton, 1995) In fact, some academic economists suggest, only partially in jest, that if one 
wants to know what the true economic impact of a stadium project is, simply take whatever 
number the consultants project and then move the decimal point one place to the left.  
However, in specific circumstances it may be possible to justify some level of public 
subsidies for the construction of sports venues. This should not be interpreted to mean that the 
optimal level of public spending is the roughly two-thirds of average stadium construction costs 
that taxpayers paid for during the period from 1990 through 2008 or even the roughly one-third 
of stadium construction costs that taxpayers paid for on average since the Great Recession in 
2008. Rather, the only claim being made here is that the optimal level of funding may be higher 
than 0%.  
 
Stadiums as Public Goods 
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It is a standard axiom of welfare economics that free markets lead to optimal allocations 
and that any government intervention, such as subsidies for stadium construction, that interferes 
with the normal operation of the market is likely to lead to welfare losses to society as a whole. 
Equally standard, however, is that in cases of market failure government intervention may result 
in Pareto improvements in societal outcomes. A solid case can be made that stadiums and 
professional sports franchises have a public good element to them and that stadiums and 
franchises may provide positive externalities to the local economy or to neighborhoods near the 
stadium. 
A public good is a good which is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable in its 
consumption. While tickets to sporting events are obviously excludable, and a sold-out game is 
clearly rivalrous, other aspects of sports fandom fit the standard concept of a public good. 
Broadcast games on television are a classic example of a public good, and the more esoteric 
concept of simply “being a fan” also fits the definition. Fans of a team may gain value from 
being able to root for their team and talk about their team’s successes and failure with friends 
and colleagues even if they don’t directly spend any money buying tickets, merchandise, or pay-
per-view media. Because the team or league doesn’t benefit from the value it provides to these 
fans, in a free market the product will be undersupplied. Government subsidization of an input to 
the production of the sports product through stadium subsidies may serve to bring the market 
output up to the socially efficient level.  
Professional sports franchises can also serve as an amenity that can improve the quality 
of life for local residents who are not sports fans. The team can be a source of civic pride. For 
example, when more than 60 percent of Oklahoma City voters approved $120 million of public 
spending in order to renovate the city’s Ford Center arena in the hopes (and eventual success) of 
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luring an NBA franchise to the city, civic leaders said the vote was more about “becoming a ‘Big 
League City’” rather than a road to any direct economic benefits (Seattle Times, 2008). There is 
little doubt that professional sports can serve to “put a city on the map,” and a city such as Green 
Bay, Barcelona, or Manchester may get more national or international media mentions from their 
successful sports franchises than from all other sources combined.   
Furthermore, while teams may be able to capture the use value of local sports fans 
through ticket sales, they are unlikely to be able to capture the option value of local residents. 
Option value is a common element of cost-benefit analysis that accounts for the value, or 
willingness to pay, a consumer places on having a sports entertainment option even if there is 
little or no likelihood that they will ever watch any games. The concept is often used in public 
policy decision-making in order to justify public spending on public goods such as parks or 
wilderness preserves. Sports teams clearly have some similar characteristics to these 
environmental resources.  
Because components of value such as amenity value, civic pride, and option value are 
non-market values, special techniques are required to estimate their magnitude. Two of the most 
common methods used to identify non-market values are contingent valuation and hedonic 
pricing. The contingent valuation method (CVM) uses surveys designed to get consumers to 
reveal their valuation of non-market resources, and this methodology has been used for the 
presence of sports teams and events.  
Johnson, Groothuis, and Whitehead (2001) surveyed Pittsburgh residents to find a total 
discounted non-use value of the Pittsburgh Penguins NHL team to the host MSA of between 
$17.2 and $48.3 million. These figures are only a fraction of total cost of the new $321 million 
arena the team eventually built in 2010, but they are also not zero. While amenity or non-use 
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value could not justify a public subsidy for the complete cost of the facility, an economic case for 
the public paying for something between 5% and 15% of the facility could be made. Indeed, the 
survey results could justify about one-quarter of the roughly $130 million public contribution 
that was finally made towards the Penguins’ arena. Other CVM studies of sports teams and 
facilities have found similar results and are summarized in Table 1. Studies of major sporting 
events such as the Olympics and World Cup have found similar positive “feel-good” effects. See, 
for example, Allmers and Maennig (2009).  
 
Table 1:  Examples of CVM Studies of Sports Teams 
Location Sport Non-use value  
($ mil.) 





Pittsburgh NHL $17.2-$48.3 $321 $130 Johnson, Groothuis, and  
Whitehead (2001) 
Jacksonville NFL $36.5 $121 $121 Johnson, Mondello, and 
Whitehead (2007) 
Jacksonville NBA $22.8 n.a. n.a. Johnson, Mondello, and 
Whitehead (2007) 
Calgary NHL $24.1C $500C (est.) $225C (est.) Johnson, et al. (2012) 
Edmonton NHL $24.6C $591C $304C Johnson, et al. (2012) 
Minnesota NFL $440.4 $1,061 $498 Fenn and Crooker (2009) 
Source:  Facility costs from Baade and Matheson (2012) and various media sources. 
 
 The hedonic pricing method of valuation uses the observed prices of goods and services 
that are sold in markets to tease out the value of a non-market component. For example, to 
determine the value of non-marketed commodity like air quality, one could compare the market 
price of a house in an area with high air quality to an otherwise identical house in a low air 
quality area and then infer that the observed difference in housing prices is the result of the 




 Carlino and Coulson (2004) use hedonic pricing to measure the housing costs in NFL 
cities to non-NFL cities. They find that home buyers are willing to pay 8% more for houses in 
NFL cities which the authors attribute to the amenity value of NFL franchises. It should be noted 
that this study is not without its detractors and that Carlino and Coulson’s results are not robust 
to variations in model specification (Coates, Humphreys, and Zimbalist, 2006). Findings by Feng 
and Humphreys (2012; 2018) that residential housing values rise near professional sports venues 
can also be explained by appealing to the amenity value of a having a professional sports 
entertainment option nearby. 
 
Stadiums as Neighborhood Development Tools 
 Stadiums and arenas can also serve as an anchor for local economic development. While 
the old construction model of a stadium as a “walled fortress surrounded by a moat of parking 
lots” clearly led to few neighborhood spillovers, modern arena construction has been much more 
successful at integrating stadiums into local, and recently more often than not, downtown 
neighborhoods (Baade, Matheson, and Nikolova, 2007). While the data clearly show that 
stadiums and arenas do not typically lead to citywide increases in economic activity, there is 
strong evidence of localized impacts. Tu (2005), Feng and Humphreys (2012; 2018), and 
Propheter (2018) all find significant increases in real estate prices near stadiums, and many 
stadium projects such as PetCo Stadium in San Diego (Rosentraub, 2014), Rogers Place in 
Edmonton (Staples, 2015), and Barclays Arena in Brooklyn, have seen significant commercial 
and residential real estate development in the area of the stadium following facility construction. 
Indeed, some stadiums deals may be better thought of as real estate developments with a stadium 




Of course, it is important to recognize that much of the real estate development that can 
accompany stadium construction may have occurred otherwise, and stadium subsidies may just 
be an expensive way to relocate economic activity from one area of the city to another. However, 
there could be real economic reasons to promote the economic health of one region of a city over 
another. First of all, well-designed stadiums built with an urban plan in mind may result in an 
agglomeration of entertainment businesses (Humphreys and Zhou, 2015). A concentrated 
entertainment district created by a stadium, such as San Diego’s Gaslamp District or Denver’s 
LoDo, may increase economic activity by creating a focused attraction for tourists and visitors 
from outside the city.  
Second, there may be real public policy or urban planning reasons to value one area in a 
city over another. It is commonly argued that vibrant and active downtown areas produce 
“unique and valuable intangible benefits for their cities” (Johnson, et al., 2012). An economically 
healthy downtown provides a local identity, promotes the city’s image, enhances civic pride, and 
serves as melting pot for different races, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes (Rosentraub, 
2008). If viable central business districts are more valuable to a metropolitan area’s image and 
economic prospects than other locations in the area, it may make sense to spend public money to 
locate a stadium and its accompanying economic impact into a downtown location in order to 
boost that area even if income in the greater metropolitan region is unchanged. 
 
Political Economy 
 Along a similar vein, to the extent that stadiums simply relocate spending from one area 
to another, if these locations are in different government jurisdictions, it may be profitable for 
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local governments to subsidize facility construction in order to shift the economic activity of the 
team from a neighboring town to their own. For example, the Dallas Cowboys and Texas 
Rangers are clearly teams enjoyed by fans throughout the region who would be willing to travel 
anywhere in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex to watch games. When Arlington, Texas 
subsidizes stadiums for these teams, they attract fans to Arlington who otherwise would have 
spent their time and money in other parts of the metropolitan area. While again regional 
economic activity is unchanged, Arlington’s economy benefits at the expense of other cities and 
towns in the area.  
Under this line of thought, it is clear that stadium subsidies reflect poor regional 
economic policy even as they may be good local economic policy. For this reason, lawmakers 
have occasionally banded together to prevent this sort of destructive cross-border competition for 
sports franchises, but this type of multi-jurisdictional decision-making is difficult to accomplish 
in practice (Suderman, 2018). 
Stadium projects (as well as mega-events) are often also touted as methods to force 
politicians to undertake needed improvements in general infrastructure that are unable to 
generate sufficient political will without an external catalyst like a new sports facility. Following 
the Athens Olympics in 2004, Spyros Kapralos, president of the Hellenic Olympic Committee 
noted, “…the Games did serve to upgrade a big portion of the infrastructure of the city and the 
country. Greece lives off tourism and after the Olympics, Athens got a new airport, new ring 
roads, new metro, new tram system, new trolleys, new buses, new telecommunications network, 
new power stations. The quality of life here improved immensely.” (Smith, 2012) 
Similarly, the city of Worcester, Massachusetts justified its planned $70 million 
expenditure on a new minor league baseball stadium in part on its ability to convince the state to 
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put $35 million in transportation infrastructure improvements into the area around the proposed 
stadium. According the Massachusetts’ lieutenant governor, the commonwealth had “long 
wanted” to do a project to improve the intersection before the stadium, ranked as far and away 
the most dangerous intersection in the state for traffic accidents. However, only with the 
announcement of the stadium project did the Department of Transportation commit funding to 
the project (Croteau, 2018). Obviously, it would be better for local taxpayers to get the needed 
infrastructure improvements without the wasteful expense of hosting the Olympics or building a 
baseball stadium, but government activities are not always without friction, and using a stadium 
project to spur other more useful infrastructure projects may be a second-best solution. 
 
Is zero really zero? 
  Even under the most optimistic estimates, professional sports teams play a small role in 
the large, diverse economies in which they reside, and it is easy for the impact of sports to get 
lost in the natural variations of the local economy. Many studies of the impact of professional 
sports facilities that find no statistically significant impact of sports on tangible economic 
variables are underpowered. This is particularly true of many of the older studies that relied on 
metropolitan area wide annual data (Coates and Humphreys, 1999). Even if a new stadium were 
to inject tens or hundreds of millions of dollars into the economy, given the fact most major 
league cities sport gross domestic products well in excess of $100 billion, searching for such a 
“small” figure is akin to looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack.  
For example, Baade and Matheson’s (2006) examination of the Super Bowl found that its 
impact on the host economies was not statistically different from zero. However, the authors also 
noted that given the sensitivity of their model, the Super Bowl would have to generate at least 
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$300 million in benefits before they would pick it up as statistically significant. Any impact level 
below that, no matter how real the benefits were, could not be differentiated from the statistical 
noise. 
 More recent studies have attempted to solve this problem by looking at smaller 
geographic areas or shorter time frames, effectively making the haystack smaller (e.g. Baumann, 
Matheson, and Muroi, 2009), but even with improvements in measurement techniques it is still 
much more accurate to claim that the peer-reviewed literature generally doesn’t find large 
economic benefits from building new stadiums as opposed to claiming that the literature proves 
that there are no benefits whatsoever.   
 
Conclusions 
It remains true that stadiums are typically poor public investments. Research in peer-
reviewed journals finds little evidence that professional sporting franchises or events generate 
tangible new economic benefits for their cities. It would be exceedingly rare to find a sports 
facility project that would justify a public subsidy that would cover most of or all of the 
construction cost. However, the (absolutely true) claim that sports generate minimal economic 
benefits is not the same as claiming that sporting events, facilities, and franchises provide zero in 
net economic benefits for their host communities. And the same peer-review literature that finds 
little evidence of tangible economic benefits in the form of increased income, wages, 
employment, and tax revenues also consistently finds positive public good benefits as measured 
by both contingent valuation and hedonic pricing methods. 
urthermore, even if stadiums do not increase net economic activity or citywide societal 
welfare at all, the evidence is fairly clear that they can generate significant neighborhood effects, 
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and policy makers may have good reason to make a conscious decision to preference one area 
over another. Therefore, it may be possible to justify some level of public subsidies for the 
construction of sports venues. It is again crucial to reiterate that this should not be interpreted to 
mean that the optimal level of public spending is anywhere near what taxpayers in North 
America (and many places in the rest of the world) have paid for stadiums and arenas over the 
past several decades. Simply, one can make a reasonable economic argument that the optimal 
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Response to Professor Humphreys 
 
Professor Humphreys suggests that subsidies for the construction of new or refurbished 
professional sports facilities cannot be justified by the research presented in peer-reviewed 
journals. As an author of a significant portion of that literature, I am in broad agreement with that 
assessment. It is clear that teams, leagues, and sponsors of major sporting events such as FIFA or 
the International Olympic Committee routinely exaggerate the benefits from building sports 
infrastructure and hosting sporting events while downplaying the costs.  
As further noted by Professor Humphreys, the monopoly power exerted by the suppliers 
of spectator sports places cities in direct competition with one another for teams and events and 
puts them at a distinct disadvantage to the purveyors of sports when attempting to negotiate on 
the appropriate level of public subsidy for sports facilities. It is fairly easy to look at the over $20 
billion (nominal) of taxpayer money spent on professional sports facilities in the U.S. and 
Canada since 1990 and decry the waste and injustice without asking the harder question about 
what would have been a reasonable and economically justifiable amount of public spending for 
this multitude of new and substantially refurbished stadiums and arenas (Baade and Matheson, 
2012). 
Professor Humphreys notes that using stadiums to revitalize distressed urban areas may 
“not lead to increases in social welfare if local residents are indifference between various 
residential locations,” and that “proponents of subsidies for sports-related urban revitalization 
projects have not provided any evidence of specific market failures that would generate” a spatial 
disequilibrium that would justify a place-based economic development policy (Glaeser and 
Gottlieb, 2008).  
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I believe the evidence is in Professor Humphreys’ favor if one is simply considering 
placing arenas and stadiums in blighted areas in order to clean up and gentrify a particular part of 
town. On the other hand, many urban planners (eg. Rosentraub, 2014) do believe that the central 
business districts of modern cities possess attributes of a public good, and it is well-accepted that 
government subsidization is a reasonable solution the market failure associated with the 
provision of public goods. I share Professor Humphreys’ concern that the talk about the magic of 
the urban central core is often based more on rhetoric than data, but it is also clear that vibrant 
and thriving downtowns are a clear amenity for residents living anywhere within a metropolitan 
area and may help cities attract and retain a highly skilled workforce. 
Professor Humphreys’ paper makes a nice contribution to the literature by reviewing 
much of the newer work on the costs and benefits of sport facilities. Much of this research 
focuses on the potential negative externalities associated with professional sports. With respect 
to the findings on crime, I am not entirely convinced that the fact that crime increases around 
sporting events is particularly damning. As Willie Sutton famously quipped about why he robbed 
banks, “Because that’s where the money is,” it should come as no surprise that crime increases 
when one congregates a large number of people in a specific place. Stadium subsidy opponents 
(including both myself and Professor Humphreys) often argue that the presence of economic 
activity around sporting events shouldn’t count as a benefit if sports related spending has simply 
displaced spending that would have occurred in other locations. Similarly, if a big sporting event 
attracts all of the pickpockets and purse-snatchers, that shouldn’t be considered as a cost if this 
crime is simply diverted from another part of town.  
In addition, not all of the literature suggests that sporting contests increase crime. Copus 
and Laquer (2018) examine citywide criminal activity in Chicago and find consistent decreases 
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in crime during times at which the Chicago sports teams are playing. They attribute this decrease 
to the diversionary nature of spectator sports. This idea harkens back multiple millennia to the 
days of ancient Rome where it was claimed that the way to keep the citizenry peaceful was to 
provide “bread and circuses”.  
The findings that sporting events lead to clear negative externalities related to traffic 
congestion and air quality perhaps suggest the nature that any public subsidies for sports projects 
should take. The provision of infrastructure is a core responsibility of government, and ensuring 
that customers and businesses can efficiently meet up with one another is a role that government 
can and should take on. Therefore, many critics of general stadium subsidies (this author 
included) can embrace generous public spending on transportation projects in coordination with 
privately financed stadiums.  
For example, Gillette Stadium, home of the NFL’s New England Patriots and MLS’s 
New England Revolution, was built in 2002 with $325 million in private funding from owner 
Robert Kraft. However, as part of the stadium construction project, the state of Massachusetts 
agreed to provide $33 million in public funding for road and interchange enhancements that 
would improve fan access to the stadium (Baade and Matheson, 2012). This type of spending 
modestly subsidizes the construction of the stadium while reducing both the traffic congestion 
and the related air pollution associated with events at the stadium. Both the magnitude and the 
type of public funding provided to the Gillette Stadium construction project, at least, seem 
entirely reasonable to this author, and I suspect Professor Humphreys would agree. 
It is the nearly unanimous opinion of economists that stadium and arena subsidies 
represent a poor use of public funds (IMG Forum, 2017), and governments in the U.S. and 
Canada have spent far too much money over the past three decades subsidizing playing facilities 
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for millionaire players and billionaire owners. There are sound economic reasons, however, to 
provide some level of public subsidy for stadiums, but given the natural bargaining advantages 
that sports teams have over host cities due to their monopoly power, there is little reason to 
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